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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

STEAVEN R.. HESTER,
Plaintiff,
vs.,
Case No. 18220
SOUTH OGDEN CITY and
STATE INSURANCE FUND
Defendant.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a workmen's compensation case involving an
employee of South Ogden City.
DISPOSITION BY THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The Administrative Law Judge entered Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order which granted benefits to the
applicant for a knee injury that he allegedly suffered on June 5th,
1978, but denied any benefits related to a hip injury that plaintiff
alleged occured more than a year later as a result of the original
industrial accident.

A Motion for Review of the Order of the

Administrative Law Judge as to the denial of benefits for the hip
was timely filed, which motion was denied by the Industrial Commission
on December 24, 1981.

The Industrial Commission affirmed the

order of the Administrative Law Judge in pertinent part.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
It is respectfully submitted that the Order, as affirmed
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by the Industrial Commission, should be upheld by the Supreme
Court.
FACTS
While defendant does not specifically disagree with
plaintiff's factual statement, the statement contains only those
facts that the plaintiff wishes to present in support of his appeal.
Therefore, it is necessary that certain facts be supplied that
require emphasis which is not given in plaintiff's brief.
On June 5, 1978 while in the course of his employment,
with defendant South Ogden City, plaintiff was injured in an
industrial accident.

Then the garbage truck on which he was working

made contact with his left knee causing a hyperextension injury.
(R. 1,3,4,14) His primary medical care was undertaken by Dr.
Fred F. Brewer, who diagnosed a pre-patella bursitis septic.
(R.3)

Because of continuing complaints and difficulties, Doctor

Brewer performed surgeries on the left knee on July 18, 1978

(R. 3, 15), October 17, 1978,

(R. 5, 16) and March 5, 1979.

Following the third surgery on the knee, his treating
physician felt that his condition was significantly improving and
in fact, found that the left knee condition had stabilized no later
than in August of 1979.

(R. 46, 87, 95, 232, 286-287, 289,)

The first complaint of any hip problems or difficulties
occured in an office visit with Doctor Brewer by plaintiff on
June 7, 1979.

(R. 33, 221, 287, 303)

That complaint was one

year and 2 days following the alleged industrial event.
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It should be noted that the Statement of Facts as it
follows from here is intended to give those facts which support
the decision of the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial
Commission of Utah.

It is acknowledged that the opinion of the

treating physician, Dr. Brewer, is that there is an indirect
connection between the knee injury and the hip difficulties of the
plaintiff due to gait changes resulting from his favoring his left
leg.

(Ro 285)

Two surger1es have in fact been performed on the

left hip condition:
2.

1 ..

On March 24, 1981.

September 4, 1979 (R. 16, 46) and

(R. 290).

Doctor Brewer has made the following comments during the
course and progress of plaintiff's hip problem:
1.

September 3, 1979 - " .••• At the hip, the range of
motion is normal, but there is considerable pain
with the rotation articularly.
I can elicit
no definite snapping sensation but the tenderness
is well-localized to greater trochanter." (R. 188)

2.

September 4, 1979 - Operative report - " .....
Trochanteric Bursa. was visualized and most of
the bursa! tissue removed for diagnostic purposes.
The bursa did not appear grossly abnormal ... "
(R. 194, 303)

3..

From Hearing transcript -

"

Q.

(by Mr. Black) Doctor, let me go on to the
snapping hip problem. That sort of problem
you see fairly often in your practice, is
that correct?

A.

It's not a rarity.
either.

Q.

Sometimes that occurs with or without trauma,
is that correct?

A.

Yes.

It's not a common occurance
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Q.

Sometimes it just occurs on a developmental
basis without having any other physiological
problem, isn't that correct?

A.

There are occasions when I have no reasonable
explaination why it occured." (R. 52)
St. Benedict's Hospital records, by Doctor Brew~
dated 3-23-82 - " .... In recent months, he has
redeveloped pain about the hip and would still
appear to be disabled, although this is difficult
to evaluate at (sic) this patient is certainly not
particularly intelligent and and (sic) as well,
appears to be interested in continuing disability
and remuneration for the same.

A number of objective studies have been conducted including
X-rays and EMGs, all of which report no abnormal findings.

(R.

189,

207, 209,)
The plaintiff was referred for consultation and treatment
to Doctor John M. Bender in the latter part of 1979.

Doctor Bender

has stated the following:
1.

April 14, 1980 - "
Steaven has no definate
neurologic loss in left lower extremity or
elsewhere. Electromyography performed 12-12-79
is normal. Though he describes numbness, there
are no objective signs of sensory or motor loss
or reflex abnormalities".
(R. 183)

Following the initial evQdentiary hearing of October 2,
1980, the applicant was referred to a Medical Panel comprised of
Dr. Charles M. Swindler, an orthopedic surgeon, and Dr. Richard
S. Iverson, a neuro-psychiatrist.

Doctor Swindler was the panel

chairman and in conjunction with Doctor Iverson, prepared a
report of his examination dated December 30, 1980.

In pertinent

part the report stated the following concerning their examination:
" . . . . On physical examination we are confronted with
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a healthy appearing young white male, who on gross
inspection in the office, walked with a profound
cog-wheel type of limp in the entire left lower
extremity. He walked as if he had a totally stiff
knee and furthermore, in the erect walking attitude
he listed his entire vertebral column markedly to
the left and somewhat forwarde At the time of the
initial examination, the man was wearing western boots.
During the process of disrobing for the e~amination,
he appeared to have great difficulty removing the boot
on the left lower extremity - presumably this was due
to the supposed stiff left kneeo On the other hand,
when it came time to remove his jeans, he very actively
flexed his left hip and his left knee to their full
range of flexion. When asked to sit on the examining
table, he maintained his knee in an extended attitude
and furthermore he maintained his left foot in some
varus and adduction. When standing the man complained
of intense pain in the left leg to a point where he
would not bear full weight on the left lower extremity,
even in the standing attitude. However, when asked to
walk across the room with the arms extended and the
eyes shut he would bear weight evenly on both lower
extremities and in point of fact, at one point he
stumbled slightly, thereby upsetting his sense of
erect balance but from the objective point of view, he
recovered his balance quickly and with great alacrity
as far as the l·eft extremity is concerned. As far as
ambulation is concerned the patient had a very normal
heel gait but he stated that the hip pain "tore him up"
so that he could not perform a toe gait. Additionally
the patient was unable to perform a tandum gait because
he stated that his "left hip was too weak".
In the standing erect attitude, the man was noted
to have full range of motion of the entire vertebral
column in all planes. There was noted, as far as the
low back examination is concerned, no muscle spasm;
there was no guarding; there was no local tenderness,
either superficial or deep in character.
Indeed, the
man was able to flex forward and bring the finger tips
to the floor.
He could get on and off the examining
table without any apparent difficulty; on the other hand,
when asked to turn and twist on the examining table he
complained bitterly of pain and stiffness in his left
hip. Again he would state that "my hip is corning out
of the joint and is becoming unraveled."
In the supine attitude on the examining table, the
right lower extremity as well as the low back appeared to
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be normal in all respects. Passively, as far as motion
in the left hip was concerned here, by means of confusion,
there was noted full synunetrical motion in all planes as
compared with the op2osite extremity. The patient
violently resisted the passive manipulation of the straight
leg raising sign and when asked to voluntarily perform
the flexion of the left hip in the supine position he
presented a typical cog-wheel type of· rigidity.
In the sitting attitude on the examining table,
the man was found to have both actively and passivel
full flexion of the affected left hip.
Indeed, he could
in the sitting attitude, flex forward and bring the
chin to the knees without apparent difficulty
Examination of the left knee both in the supine
attitude and in the sitting was quite inconsistent. At
one point the man would contend that he was unable to
either extend his left knee to his maximum physiologic
range or to flex the left knee and yet, with manuvers of
distraction during the physical examination, the left
knee was noted to flex very freely to 45 degrees and to
extend to 180 degrees.
The sciatic stretch sign
bilaterally .was negative. Muscle power evaluation in
both feet was normal and all muscle component levels.
Knee jerk and ankle jerk reflexes were brisk and equal
bilaterally.
There was only a questionable suggestion of uniform
atrophy of the left lower extremity - this is in spite
of the fact that the patient stated that he was unable
to use this limb for the past several months . . . .
Assuming but not deciding that the applicant was
involved in the events as alleged, we find the following
information to be germaine to the problem presented to
us:
I.

Are the applicant's medical problems of the left
hip attributed to the left knee injury of June 5,

1978?
The problems of the left hip are not
attributable or related to the left knee
injury.
This observation is based on the
medical history; the clinical findings; the
results of the x-ray examination and the
specific lack of demonstrable organic
pathology to confirm a casual relationship.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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IIo

What is the applicant's total permanent disability
rating based upon the combined left knee and left
hip injuries?
We do not find objective evidence of an
increment of total permanent disability
as it would be related to the left knee and
the left hip. This observation is based
on the lack of demonstrable pathology, i.e.
no radiographic evidence of injury; no
clinical findings of diminished range of
motion of the respective joints in question;
no clinical sign of atrophy or muscle power
loss and/or gross skeletal deformity

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
VI.

What is the overall percentage of permanent
disability of this applicant including both
physical and psychologic factors?
There is no permanent disability factor
involved as we see this patient.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
XII. Absent any pre-existing condition, what effect,
if any, would the accident have had regarding
his psychiatric impairment?
Clinical examination and evaluation of
this patient's mental status by this
board, particularly the neuro-psychiatric
member failed to demonstrate any true
presently existing psychiatric disease.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

xv.

Which, if any, of Mr. Hester's present complaints
are causally related to the industrial injury
and which, if any, are unrelated and to what
extent does each category contribute to his
present impairment?
The subjective complaints, as they refer
to the left thigh and the left hip are,
in the opinion of the panel, unrelated to
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the industrial accident in question but on
the other hand as of this examination
appear to be the major cause of the patient'
present alleged impairment.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
XVII. What is the percentage of permanent physical
impairment if any, attributable to the industrial
injury of June 5, 1978?
The medical panel is unable to demonstrate
any impairment of physical function of the
musculo-skeletal system attributable to the
industrial injury on June 5, 1978.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
XX.

What medical treatments, if any, including
medication, will be reasonably required in
treating Mr. Hester as a result of the industrial
injury of June 5, 1978 in the foreseeable future?
As a result of this examination the medical
panel feels that maximum medical benefit
has been obtained and that no further
specific treatment including medication is
indicated. Certainly, there is no
indication for any corrective surgery.
There is no indication for the use of a
physical appliance, such as a brace. There
is no demonstrable evidence of a neuropsychiatric disease and therefore, there
is no indication for any specific neuropsychiatric medication. Physical therapy
and muscle re-education exercises have
in the past been outlined by competent
physicians and these modalities of management
the patient refused to accept. Physical
therapy, now, is no clinically indicated.
(R. 244-250)
(Emphasis Added)
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- 9 After submission of the above findings by the Medical
Panel to the parties, the plaintiff in a timely fashion objected
to those findings on January 28, 19810

(R. 254)

At the time of

the hearing on June 12, 1981, on the plaintiff's objections, Dr.·
Charles Mo Swindler, panel Chairman, appeared in support of the
medical panel report (R. 258).

Following the laying of the

foundation for the admission of the Medical Panel Report, the
Administrative Law Judge admitted the report subject to the
cross-examination of counsel for plaintiff.

(R. 264)

Doctor

Swindler confirmed that the panel could find no permanent impairment
that they could relate to the industrial injury.

(R. 264)

Doctor

Swindler also affirmed that it was highly speculative that the
hip problems were related to non-use of the hip as a result of the
knee.

(R. 268-269, 277)
Following Doctor Swindler's testimony the treating

physician was called by the plaintiff and testified in
support of his opinion that the hip problem was indeed caused
indirectly by the gait and abnormal use of the left leg over a
period of time.

He further assigned specific percentages of

impairment to both the knee and hip.

(R.

278-314)

At the conclusion of Doctor Brewer's testimony, Doctor
Swindler was recalled as a witness.

He was asked if any of the

testimony he had heard or any additional records that he may have
examined had changed his opinion as to the causal relationship of
the hip problems to the industrial accident.

His reply was that

nothing that had taken place had changed the opinions expressed in
(R. 314)
the Medical
andfor digitization
during
his
testimony.
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Based upon the above evidence the Administrative Law
Judge entered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
on October 29, 19810

The specific findings of fact in support of

the Administrative Law Judge's decision to deny benefits for the
left hip difficulties, were very specific and are as follows:
"The applicant was referred to a Medical Panel for an
examination and report.
The panel report is hereby
incorporated by reference.
The panel found that as a
result of the accident of June 5, 1978, that the
applicant had suffered no permanent physical impairment
to said left knee and that there is no causal relationship between the accident of June 5, 1978, and the
hip surgery of September 1979 • . • •
The Administrative Law Judge further finds that the
applicant is not entitled to permanent physical disability
compensation for either of the hip operations nor is he
entitled to temporary total disability compensation for the
periods that he was recouperating due to the hip surgery.
(R. 357) I I .

I'

Consistent with the above Findings of Fact, the Administrativl
Law Judge denied benefits for the left hip difficulties.

(R. 357-358)

Thereafter, the plaintiff timely· filed a Motion for Review
of the Administrative Law Judge's Order (R. 367) accompanied by a
Memorandum of Points and Authorities (R. 360-366).

On December 28,

1981 the Industrial Commission after performing it's statutorily
required review of the entire record affirmed the Administrative
Law Judge's decision.

(R. 369-370).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SUPREME COURT IS PRECLUDED FROM WEIGHING EVIDENCE
AND/OR REVIEWING FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION.
§37-1-85, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, states in part:
The findings and conclusions of the commission
on questions of fact shall be conclusive and final
and shall not be subject to review; such questions
of fact shall include ultimate facts and the
findings and conclusions of the commission.
As can be seen from the foregoing, the Supreme Court is
without authority to disturb factual conclusions of the Industrial
Commission.
The issue of weighing conflicting evidence is left
with the Industrial Commission.
43 P2d 1069,

Russell v. Industrial Commission,

(1953) states in part, at 1072 and 1073:

By express statutory provisions and by a long
line of decisions of this court we are precluded
from weighing conflicting evidence and making findings
of fact.
That is the providence of the commission.
The duties of this court are limited to a determination
of questions of law. We may interfere with the
commission's findings of fact in those cases where an
award is granted without support of competent evidence,
and likewise, where an award is denied against uncontradicted evidence without any reasonable basis for
disbelieving the same.
In such cases a question of law
is presented for determination; otherwise, the findings
of the commission must be affirmed. . .
When any one of two or more inferences may
reasonably be drawn from the evidence, this court
is not authorized to direct which inference must be
drawn, and, likewise, when, as in the instant case,
it is somewhat of a speculation as to where or how
the deceased recieved the injury complained of, this
court is precluded from directing an award.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Case law has continually sustained this position taken
by the Court and the legislature.

See Wilson et al v. Industrial

Commission,

Jones v. Ogden Auto Body, Sup Ct

108 p2d 519,

(1940);

No. 17853 (Utah April 24, 1982);

Clinger v. Industrial Commission,

571 p2d 1328 (Utah 1977); Savage v. Industrial Commission, 565 p2d
782 (Utah 1977).
A cursory examination of the facts in the instant case
reveals conflict between two qualified experts.

The plaintiff

contends that because Oro Swindler deferred to the treating
physician actual periods of temporary total disability, that he
likewise deferred the primary issue of the causal relationship of
the hip problems to the industrial accident.
pp. 6-9).

That simply is not the case.

(Plaintiff's brief

Dr. Swindler clearly

stated his opinion that the hip problems were totally unrelated.

POINT II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IS NOT COMPELLED TO ACCEPT
THE TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF'S TREATING PHYSICIAN
As stated above, the Industrial Commission must be
sustained unless it acted arbitrarily.

The evidence indicates,

however, that substantial conflict existed between Plaintiff's
position and other substantive evidence before the Commission.
As a result, Plaintiff seems to argue that the Commission must
accept his testimony and evidence.
Kent v. Industrial Corrunission, 57 P2d 725,

(1936),

while factually different from the case at bar, contains the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

following language:

- 13 -

Recently, in the case of Gagos v. Industrial
Commission, supra, this court held, referring to
the Industrial Commission, that:
"The fact finder
is not always required to believe the uncontradicted
evidence of a witness," because there may be infirmities,
not revealed by the record which caused the evidence
to fail to carry conviction of its truth to the
Commission, and that under such circumstances the
commission was not required to find in accordance
with such evidence.
It is important to note that the Commission may
disregard even uncontroverted evidence of a witness.

This goes

further than the case at bar since the evidence of Plaintiff
is, certainly, not "uncontradicted"o
Lorange v. Industrial Commission, 153 P2d 272, 273,
(1944), states:
We cannot say from our review of the whole
record that the Commission is bound to accept the
testimony of plaintiff as to the cause of his eye injury
to the exclusion of all the other testimony and record
evidence. The testimony in the case is in conflict, it
involves discrepancies, . . . but the fact remains that
in the ultimate the evidence does not require a contrary
finding. We are also unable to say that the Commission's
decision is the result of capricious or arbitrary action,
which we would be required to determine before setting
its order aside.
It was said by Mr. Justice Frick in
Kavalinakis v. Ind. Comm., 67 Utah 174, 246 p. 698:
"Unless therefore it can be said, upon the whole record,
that the commission clearly acted arbitrarily or capriciously in making its findings and decision, this
court is powerless to interfere. Such is the manifest
purpose and intent of the Workmen's Compensation Act,
where it has been made reasonably clear that the
commission had misconstrued or misapplied the provisions
of the act, this court has never hesitated to point out
the error and to correct the same. It was not intended,
however, that this court, in matters of evidence, should
to any extent substitute its judgment for the judgment
of the commission."
(Emphasis added).
Plaintiff's position here is similar to that taken by
6) I

plaintiff in Vause v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 2d. 217,

pza

by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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his own testimony and evidence adduced on his behalf."

The

court said there:
The weakness in Plaintiff's position is one
not uncommon in appeals to this court: of becoming
so absorbed in his own contentions and so preoccupied
with the assumed righteousness of his own case that
he is unable or unwilling to give proper consideration
to the countervailing evidence.
. . . Our statutory and decisionaly law require
us to look at the evidence in the light most favorable
to the Commission's finding, and it is the obligation
of the parties involved to so present the matter to
the court.
This court cannot properly reverse the
Commission and compel an award unless there_ is
credible evidence without substantial contradiction
which points so clearly and persuasively in plaintiff's
favor that failure to so find would justify the
conclusion that the Commission acted capriciously,
arbitrarily or unreasonably in disregarding or refusing
to believe the evidence.
(Emphasis added)
At this juncture, one should refer to the case of
Mellen v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 373, 431 P2d 798,
(1967).

There an award was denied plaintiff, who suffered a

heart problem which "could have occurred while the man was
asleep or otherwise, on or off the job".

The court cites,

approvingly, language from another case, Purity Biscuit Co., v.
Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 2d 1, 201 P2d 961,

(1949), which

follows in part:
In this type of case we are dealing with
3itu.u.ticu.3 ·i u.·v·clving death or disability which
situations may, due to a functional failure, occur
by reason of the work or may be purely coincidental
with it. Where the death or disability occurs under
such circumstances as to present prima f acie doubt
as whether it was caused by exertion incidental to
the work, or an event which occurred only in the
duration of the work and in regard to which the
work furnished no material or efficient concurring
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award is made, it should appear by clear and
convincing evidence that the exertion in pursuance
of the work was at least an efficient cooperating
cause of the disability or death. The commission
should bave clear and convincing proof that the
exertion done as a part of the work, whether
ordinary or extraordinary, was a factor which
materially contributed to or caused the death or
disability. Unless the commission requires clear
and convincing proof that the disability was
employment connected, that is, materially
contributed to by the work performed, we may open
wide the door to compensating nonemployment
connected death or disabilites which the act
was not intended to cover. This rule I suppose
is primarily one of guidance for the commission.
It would seem that unless no reasonable mind
could say that the evidence was clear and
convincing, the commission could not be overturned for arbitrariness.
(Emphasis added).
Given this standard of proof, the Plaintiff did not sustain
his burden in this case.

The remainder of Mellen contains language

which is highly informative as to the case at bar.

It is, however,

repetitive and will not be cited for that reason, except as to the
following:
The fallacy which underlies plaintiff's
attack on the Commission's finding is that they
improperly attempt to focus consideration o'fthe
issues exclusively upon their own view of the
evidence and theories of the case. While some
aspects of the statistical data and medical
theories harmonize with their contention, others
fail to do so . . . (Emphasis added) .
It is respectfully submitted that the same "fallacy"
underlies the case presently at bare
As further support for the above contention, it should
be emphasized that the Commission is not bound by the opinions of
expert witnesses:
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"We have no disagreement with the plaintiff's
argument that it would be unjust and impermissible for
the Commission to obdurately ignore clear, credible
and uncontradicted evidence so that its action is
arbitrary and unreasonablee Yet {sic) is not necessarily
bound to accept the opinions of any witness or
witnesses, expert or otherwise as to what its
determination should be.
If it were so, it should be
obvious that this would t.urn the prerogative entirely
over to the expert witness and would relieve the
Commission of both its prerogative and its responsibilityo
This would be especially true in a case like this
where it would seem that the question as to the
degree of plaintiff's disability, both as to the
percentage and the permanency thereof, and how it
compares to specific disabilities listed in the
statute, is-not a problem in mathematics which can be
determined with absolute certainty, but involves the
exercise of some judgment upon which reasonable
minds might vary in their conclusions.
To be considered in connection with the foregoing
is the fact that the burden rested upon the plaintiff
to prove the extent of his disability by evidence which
persuades the Commission in accordance with his contention.
In that connection it is to be had in mind that there
was not only the evidence upon which the plaintiff
relies concerning his unemployability, but also
the evidence, which he seems to ignore, of the medical
panel which rated his disability at 50 percent, which
the Commission elected to believe and adopt as its
finding.
It is not open to question that if the
Commission had chosen to make its findings in
accordance with the plaintiff's evidence, that award
would be sustained. But upon this review it is our
duty to survey the total evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commission's determination: and to
assume that it believed those aspects of the evidence
which support its award; and we cannot properly reverse
when there is a reasonable basis therein to support
the findings and award as made.
Shipley v. C & W
Contracting Company,
528 P2d 153 {Utah 1974) {Emphasis
added) .
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CONCLUSION
As can be seen from the foregoing facts and argument,
substantive facts exist to justify the findings reached by the
Industrial Commission in this case.
~

arbitrarily or capricously.

The Commission did not act

The Commission simply chose to accept

the opinion of one expert over the opinion of the treating
physician.

It is respectfully submitted that the Court should

sustain the Industrial Commission's Order.
DATED THIS .;2.f2_.Day_of July, 1982.

BLACK &

MOORE
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